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INTRODUCTION 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heralded the beginning of a new age for the 
United States: an age of terror.  They also awakened the nation to the vulnerabilities of a free and 
open society, by placing a spotlight on the fragmented and decentralized nature of the nation’s 
homeland security.  Reacting to this problem, Congress soon took steps to centralize and 
coordinate efforts to secure the nation from further threats.   These efforts have included the 
coordination of federal activities with state and local governments as well as direct assistance to 
the states.1 
 The provision of direct assistance to the states recognizes the unique role of states in our 
federal system.  Since state and local emergency personnel are far more likely to be first 
responders in the event of a terrorist attack, they are the logical focus of efforts to organize a 
cohesive and coherent force for combating and responding to terrorist threats.  In addition, state 
and local personnel are more likely to be aware of the unique security needs of the local 
                                                 
1 One law designed to strengthen state and local terrorism readiness is the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  See 6 
U.S.C. § 361. 
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population.  For this reason it is unfortunate that Congress has not fully recognized the needs of 
tribal governments or the unique role that they play in securing the nation from external threats.2 
 One of the most important roles that tribal governments can provide in the war on terror 
is in the provision of law enforcement personnel within the territories under their jurisdiction.3  
Unfortunately, tribal authority to police tribal lands has been steadily eroded over the years until 
it has reached a point where authorities are nearly impotent to enforce their own laws let alone 
assist the federal government in the enforcement of its laws.4  The low point for tribal criminal 
law enforcement followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina.5  There the Court 
held that tribal sovereignty did not include the power to arrest and try nonmember Indians that 
have committed a crime within tribal jurisdiction.6  Congress reacted to this decision by enacting 
the so-called “Duro-fix” which restored tribal authority to prosecute nonmember Indians who 
violate applicable tribal criminal code.7 
                                                 
2 See Courtney A. Stouff, Comment, Native Americans and Homeland Security: Failure of the Homeland Security 
Act to Recognize Tribal Sovereignty, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 375 (2003) (noting that the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 treats tribes as local governments and thus places their funding at the mercy of potentially uncooperative state 
governments). 
3 Senator Inouye, commenting on proposed Senate Bill 578, noted that tribal governments currently have jurisdiction 
over approximately 260 miles of international borderland and hundreds of miles more in international water borders 
and that frequently tribal law enforcement officers are the only security forces available in the area.  See 107 CONG. 
REC. S3372 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2003) (statement of Senator Inouye). 
4 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that past Congressional actions 
impliedly divested tribes of jurisdiction over non-Indian criminal defendants); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 
544 (1980) (holding that allotment of lands divested tribe of sovereignty over hunting and fishing by non-Indians on 
such lands). 
5 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
6 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).  A nonmember Indian is an Indian who is a citizen of a tribal nation, but 
who is not a citizen of the tribe which is attempting to exercise jurisdiction over him or her.  See id. at 679. 
7 The “Duro-fix” constitutes amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act which are codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301(2), 
1301(4). 
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 The Duro opinion and the subsequent “Duro-fix” highlight the precarious position that 
tribal governments occupy under the federalism imposed upon them by the United States.  It also 
raised some troubling questions concerning the long-settled plenary power of Congress over 
tribal relations.8  Namely, does Congress’ plenary power permit it to restore sovereignty to a 
tribal government or is tribal sovereignty permanently lost once explicitly or implicitly divested 
by Congress.  Of course this begs the question as to whether Congress has in fact taken 
sovereignty away from the tribes, as was held in Duro,9 and also whether sovereignty is 
something which is truly capable of being taken away.  Nevertheless, soon after Duro and the 
“Duro-fix”, the circuit courts were confronted with the issue of whether or not Congress’ 
amendments were a restoration of sovereign power such that tribal prosecution and federal 
prosecution fit under the doctrine of dual-sovereignty or whether the restoration was a delegation 
of federal authority with double jeopardy implications.10 
 The circuit courts were soon split with regards to whether the “Duro-fix” was a 
restoration of inherent sovereignty or whether it was a delegation by Congress.11  This split was 
finally brought to the fore by United States v. Lara,12 and perhaps because of this prominent 
split, the Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in this case to determine the issue.13  The 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of the plenary power, see, infra Section I.   
9 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (The Court held that tribal sovereignty over nonmember Indians was implicitly divested 
by Congressional action.  This was the case because “[c]riminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on 
personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their 
submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States.”). 
10 See Section II.   
11 See Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled in part by United States v. 
Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998). 
12 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 46 (2003). 
13 See United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 46 (2003). 
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result will have grave implications for the ability of Congress to fully restore tribal authority to 
police the territories under their authority and to assist the federal government in securing the 
United States from terrorist threats.  If the Supreme Court holds that Congress is incapable of 
restoring tribal authority based upon the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, Congress will have lost a 
valuable ally in the war on terror.  If the Court holds in favor of the restoration of inherent 
sovereignty, then Congress may some day choose to go beyond fixing Duro v. Reina14 and 
restore the tribes to their full sovereign right to police their territories. 
 In this comment I argue that Congress has the power to unfetter the tribal government’s 
right to regulate and police its own territory without a delegation of Congressional sovereignty.  
Specifically, this comment argues that: 1) Congress does not have the power to create or destroy 
sovereignty but only the power to recognize or not recognize existing tribal sovereignty and 2) 
even if sovereignty is capable of divestiture, the Court’s decision in Duro was merely an exercise 
of the Court’s power to declare the federal common law, which does not in and of itself divest a 
tribe of sovereignty.  Since Congress is the sole branch with the power to regulate the relations of 
the United States with respect to tribes, Congress can correct the Supreme Court’s federal 
common law decisions affecting tribes that are inconsistent with its views. 
 Section I describes the development of tribal sovereignty and Congress’ plenary power to 
deal with tribes.  Section II examines the development of the split in the Eighth and Ninth Circuit 
Courts.  Finally, this comment analyzes the arguments presented by the various Circuit Court 
opinions addressing the interplay of Duro and the “Duro-fix” and concludes that the historically 
                                                 
14 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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and logically supported argument is that Congress is able to restore tribal sovereignty to its 
original status without delegating federal sovereignty. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF MODERN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 The early relations between the American Colonies and the Native American tribes were 
bi-lateral in nature.15  The colonists traded, negotiated, allied and occasionally warred with their 
neighboring tribes.16  Although many European settlers did not equate tribes as sovereign states 
in the European sense, they nearly uniformly recognized that the tribes were sovereign peoples 
capable of entering into binding treaties.17 
 The importance of this sovereign to sovereign contact is evidenced by the numerous 
treaties entered into between the tribes, England and the colonies.18  Tribes were powerful 
neighbors and the protection afforded by allying with them and the wealth that could be obtained 
by trading with them, was routinely noted in these treaties.19  After the Revolutionary War, the 
                                                 
15 See e.g., The 1788 Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation.  See also Katherine Hermes, “Justice Will Be 
Done Us”: Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF 
EARLY AMERICA 123 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001) (describing the complex relations 
between the Algonquian’s and their European neighbors.  The author notes that “as a result of contact, a set of 
indigenous legal rules emerged, especially with regard to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, interpretation, and 
final resolution of conflict.”  Id. at 126. 
16 See Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire; Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 416-
419 (1942 Ed.) (describing the New York Indians and their early relations with the colonies). 
17 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 55-60 (4th ed. 1998) (noting the 
early practice of making treaties with tribes) [hereinafter Getches]. 
18 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 58 (1831) (Thompson J., dissenting) (referring to the “innumerable 
treaties” formed with tribal nations.). 
19 See Getches, supra note 17 at 57 (“Regardless of conflicting religious interpretations of Indian rights, when tribes 
were numerous and relatively powerful, European colonies and colonizing nations found it to their advantage and 
safety to seek Indian consent to settlement.”). 
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American States inherited the sovereign role of the English crown.20  Under the Articles of 
Confederation, each state dealt with its own internal tribes on an individual basis in spite of 
Congressional authority to handle the nation’s Indian affairs.21  Later, when the Constitution was 
drafted, the sovereign power to deal with tribes was specifically delegated to the federal 
government.22 
 The delegation of the power to regulate commerce with the tribes found in Article I is one 
of only two clauses mentioning Indians within the Constitution.23  It is because of this paucity of 
references within the Constitution itself and the peculiar nature of the placement of the 
delegation to Congress regarding tribal relations, that the nature of tribal sovereignty has been a 
point of contention from the earliest days of the United States.  And from the beginning, it has 
fallen to the Supreme Court of the United States to define how the tribes fit within the federalist 
framework of the Constitution. 
A.  The Marshall Trilogy 
 The current status of tribal sovereignty is primarily derived from a triad of seminal 
Supreme Court opinions dating from early the nineteenth century.  These opinions are often 
                                                 
20 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) (“By this treaty (ending the Revolutionary war), the 
powers of government, and the right to soil, which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to these 
States.). 
21 See ART. CONF. art. IX p. 4 (giving Congress the power to regulate the affairs with Indians not part of a State).   
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The framers of the Constitution wanted to make it clear that Congress alone had 
the power to deal with the tribes.  See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 142 (Bicentennial Edition, Norton) (complaining that States had on numerous occasions engaged in war and 
made treaties with the tribes without Congressional permission).  As a result of this, the power of Congress to 
regulate commerce was amended to include tribes and explicitly to include tribes within State borders.  See id. at 
509. 
23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the power to regulate commerce) & art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding Indians not taxed 
from the calculation of representatives).  The Fourteenth Amendment retained the ‘Indians not taxed’ language of 
Article I Section 2 when it abolished the three-fifths formula for slaves.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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referred to as the “Marshall trilogy” after their author, Chief Justice Marshall.  These cases serve 
as the starting point for any inquiry into the status of tribes within the Constitutional framework. 
1.  Johnson v. M’Intosh24 
 The first of the Marshall triad, Johnson v. M’Intosh, ostensibly did not deal with 
sovereignty at all.  The case was actually between two persons claiming title to the same land, 
originally held by native tribes.25  The question of sovereignty arose because Johnson derived his 
title through a predecessor in title who purchased the land directly from the tribe in 1773 and 
1775 whereas M’Intosh claimed his title through a sale by the United States government in 
1818.26  The United States had obtained sovereignty over the land after the end of the war with 
England but had not otherwise directly purchased or conquered the land in question.27  The Court 
felt that the question could not be answered without first looking at the nature of the title held by 
the tribes and that this in turn was dependant upon the nature of the tribes’ sovereignty.28 
 Chief Justice Marshall began the discussion by explicitly recognizing the European 
created doctrine of discovery, which stated that a discovering European power had title to all 
lands discovered as against all other European powers and that the tribes merely held a 
subordinate right of occupancy.29  Essentially this meant that only the discovering European 
                                                 
24 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
25 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571-72 (1823). 
26 See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 550-51, 555-56, 560. 
27 The land was originally claimed by Virginia but was passed to the federal government as part of a compromise.  
See id. at 559. 
28 See id. at 572. 
29 See id. at 572-73. 
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power could effectively divest the tribe of its lands.30  Marshall further noted in his decision that 
tribes did not have full sovereignty but rather that “their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”31  Thus in an attempt to mediate a land 
dispute between two European peoples, the Court unilaterally relegated tribal sovereignty to 
something less than the full sovereignty of a European nation state. 
 In spite of this holding, the Court did recognize that the native tribes were in fact 
sovereign, albeit limited sovereigns.  Interestingly, in a discussion of the nature of title held by a 
European purchaser from a tribe, the Court notes that such a purchaser “incorporates himself 
with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and 
subject to their laws.”32  This is an explicit recognition that tribes have sovereignty over their 
lands and can even fashion their own laws to govern those lands.  The Court goes on to state that 
this still does not save the purchaser of tribal title because it “derives its efficacy from their will” 
and the tribe is still free to annul the transfer.33  And since the tribe ceded the land to the United 
                                                 
30 The Court noted that the United States was the successor to England’s title to the discovered lands and that as 
such the United States had the “exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest.”  Id. at 587. 
31 Id. at 574. 
32 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added).  Thus Johnson’s sole recourse must be had through the tribal 
government since the transfer cannot “give a title which our Courts could distinguish from the title of [the] tribe, as 
it might still be conquered from, or ceded by [the] tribe.”  Id. 
33 Id. at 594 (“These nations…had an unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American citizens.”). 
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States “without a reservation”, the United States is not bound to recognize any title derived from 
the tribe. 34 
 Johnson does not stand for the proposition that tribal governments cannot transfer good 
title to anyone.  Rather Johnson stands for the proposition that the tribe can only create title 
recognizable under the tribe’s own laws.  Thus the tribes do have title, but it is not the full title 
that a typical European state would have because the tribe cannot transfer the land to another 
sovereign, such that the transferee sovereign is now able to exert its sovereignty over the land.  
Only the discovering nation can obtain sovereign title to the land.  This makes sense and is a 
practical solution to the problem of competing European states in a new world. 
 The doctrine of discovery makes it clear that only the discovering European power can 
ever extinguish tribal sovereignty over a land to which that European power holds discovery 
title.  Thus when a state with discovery title purchases land from a tribe, the land is not only 
transferred to the discovery state, but also the exclusive power to exercise sovereignty over that 
land (unless some portion of sovereignty is reserved by the tribe).  This reduces the competition 
and concomitant international conflicts that would be precipitated by a race to be the first to 
conquer or purchase sovereign title from the tribal governments.  It also discourages and protects 
the European power from encroachments by the other European states. 
 Since the tribal transfer to Johnson cannot cause a transfer of sovereignty to the United 
States, Johnson’s title will have no efficacy in the United States.  Johnson’s title is subject to 
tribal sovereignty and he stands in the shoes of a tribal citizen.  As such when the tribe later 
                                                 
34 Id. (“Their cession of the country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair presumption, that they 
considered it as of no validity.”). 
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ceded the land to another sovereign in the treaty of Greenville, his title had only as much validity 
as the tribe bargained for in the treaty.  Unfortunately for Johnson, the tribe did not reserve any 
rights for persons holding title under its authority.35 
 Thus Johnson established that tribes are sovereign, but that their inherent sovereignty is 
diminished by the European doctrine of discovery.  This diminishment in sovereignty is 
manifested as an inability to transfer sovereign title to their lands except to a nation holding 
discovery title.36  It is the first in a long and sometimes tragic line of unilateral Court imposed 
diminishments of tribal sovereignty. 
2.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia37 
 Cherokee Nation, the next case in the Marshall triad, defined, in dicta and without a clear 
majority, the place held by tribes within the framework of the Constitution.  The case was 
brought by the Cherokee Nation, who requested an injunction against the application of laws 
passed by Georgia that attempted to exert state authority over Cherokee lands and extinguish 
their tribal government.38  Because the case was brought to the Supreme Court under its grant of 
original jurisdiction, it became necessary for the Court to address the nature of tribal 
                                                 
35 The result would have been the same if the Johnson had purchased land in Germany and that land was 
subsequently transferred to Poland by a treaty that did not reserve rights for German title holders.  If Poland then 
granted Johnson’s land to a Polish citizen, Johnson would have no claim against Poland, his sole complaint would 
be with Germany.  An example of just such a reservation of rights can be found in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, wherein Mexico ceded almost half its territory to the United States.  In that treaty, the Mexican government 
had reserved property rights to the Mexican citizens holding title to lands in the ceded territory.  See Christine A. 
Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M.L. 
REV. 201 (1996) (noting the divergent ways in which treaties of conquest have been treated by the Court). 
36 See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73. 
37 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
38 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). 
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governments and determine whether they qualified as foreign states under the Constitution.39  
The court held that jurisdiction was lacking because the tribe was not deemed to be a foreign 
state within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.40  Despite the lack of jurisdiction and 
the fact that there was no majority rationale, the remarks of the Chief Justice have had a 
profound impact on Indian law and tribal sovereignty. 
 To answer the question of whether tribes qualify as foreign states, Marshall analyzed the 
nature of tribal sovereignty and the relation of the tribes to the United States.  He noted that the 
Cherokees have been “uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country” and that 
the tribe was “a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself.”41  He furthered noted that tribes in general have the unquestioned 
“right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to 
our government” but he felt that these facts do not necessarily imply that tribes are foreign states 
within the meaning of the Constitution.42  Instead he concluded that the nature of tribal 
sovereignty, in the diminished sense articulated in Johnson v. McIntosh,43 was such that tribes 
might more accurately be deemed “domestic dependant nations” and he characterized their 
                                                 
39 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15. 
40 See id. at 20. 
41 Id. at 16. 
42 Id. at 17.  See also Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 
113, 141-42 (2002) (arguing that Native Tribal relations to the United States were more like that which European 
feudal states bore to their protecting allies). 
43 See discussion, supra, at I.  A.  1.   
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relationship to the United States as that of “a ward to his guardian.”44  As such, the tribe was a 
sovereign state, but not a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution. 45 
 Two other Justices concurred in the dismissal but would have held that tribes possessed 
no sovereignty at all.46  In his concurrence, Justice Johnson stated that the tribes were “a people 
so low in grade of organized society” that they could not be considered sovereign at all.47  In 
spite of this, he still noted that it was within the purview of the executive to recognize the 
sovereignty of those tribes that had become sufficiently civilized.48  Johnson concurred because 
the executive had not yet recognized any tribe to be sovereign such that it qualified as a foreign 
state under the Constitution.49 
 Justice Marshall concluded that tribes were sovereign, but that they have a diminished 
form of sovereignty that places them under the protection of the United States.  Alternatively, 
Justice Johnson does not see them as sovereign at all, but believes that they may become 
sovereign by becoming civilized and that this status is conferred when the executive branch 
expresses recognition of the tribe.50  As time passed, Justice Marshall’s view of tribes as 
                                                 
44 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
45 See id. at 18.  The Chief Justice also found support for his belief that the founders did not consider tribes to be 
foreign states by reference to the commerce clause which appeared to contradistinguish tribes from foreign nations.  
See id. 
46 Id. at 20-50 (Johnson, J., & Baldwin, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 21 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 21-22 (Johnson, J., concurring) (noting that until the executive recognizes the tribe as a state “we cannot 
recognize it as an existing state, under any other character than that which it has maintained hitherto as one of the 
Indian tribes or nations.”). 
49 Justice Johnson dismisses the evidence that the executive has long treated tribes as sovereigns by noting the 
apparently one-sided nature of the Treaty of Hopewell.  SeeCherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 22-23 (Johnson, J., 
concurring).  Justice Thompson finds this reasoning illogical stating that “Tributary and feudatory states do not 
thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-government, and sovereign and independent 
authority is left in the administration of the state.”  See id. at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 21-22 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
  
14 
 
domestic dependant nations would become the prevailing view.  Ironically, although Marshall’s 
opinion may have been an attempt to generate some form of legal protection for tribal 
sovereignty, it has had the effect of permitting later courts to steadily erode the boundaries of 
tribal sovereignty by virtue of the tribes “domestic dependant nation” status and the “guardian-
ward” relationship. 
3.  Worcester v. Georgia51 
 The final case of the Marshall triad definitively establishes the nature of the relationship 
between the tribes, the states and the federal government.  The case presented an issue of 
whether or not Georgia could exercise jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation and specifically 
over a citizen of Vermont who was preaching the gospel under a federal license to the Cherokee 
in violation of Georgia law.52  Although one year earlier Justice Marshall had denied that the 
Cherokee were a foreign state with standing to sue in the Supreme Court, here he eloquently 
defended the exclusive sovereignty of tribal nations and asserted that the Constitution vested the 
exclusive right to deal with the tribes in the federal government.53 
 The Chief Justice explained that “[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”54  The fact that the Cherokee have 
sought the protection of the United States in the Treaty of Hopewell does not deprive the tribe of 
                                                 
51 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
52 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 537-38 (1832). 
53 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (“The whole intercourse between the United States and this (Cherokee) nation, is, 
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.”). 
54 Id. at 559. 
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its sovereignty.55  He justified by stating, in language similar to that of Justice Thompson’s 
dissent in Cherokee Nation, “[a] weak state, in order to provide for its safety may place itself 
under the protection of a more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and 
ceasing to be a state.”56  Furthermore, he noted that Congress had been granted the “powers of 
war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among 
the several states, and with the Indian tribes” and that this was sufficient to “comprehend all that 
is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.”57  And since Congress has 
recognized the Cherokee nation through its treaty making power, the Cherokee nation’s 
sovereign power is the exclusive sovereign power within the territory so recognized and 
therefore “the laws of Georgia can have no force...but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”58 
 Worcester was the most forceful articulation of Justice Marshall’s belief that tribes were 
sovereign nations that had the exclusive right to govern their own destinies.  But he also seemed 
to recognize the precarious nature of their ability to exercise their sovereignty under pressure 
from white settlers and the various state governments.  Marshall attempted to deal with this by 
placing tribes within the Constitutional framework in such a way that the individual states would 
have no independent authority to act against the tribes.59  Unfortunately, to accomplish this he 
                                                 
55 See id. at 551 (noting that the tribal signatories did not understand the nuances of the language employed in the 
treaty of Hopewell). 
56 Id. at 561.  See also, supra note 49. 
57 Id. at 559. 
58  Id. at 561.  With this language, the Court seems to recognize that Congress has the power to recognize a foreign 
sovereign and that this recognition is binding upon the states. 
59 He did this by interpreting the Constitution to vest the federal government with the plenary power to deal with 
tribal nations.  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.  He described the powers of treaty making and war as sufficient to 
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felt compelled to define them as dependant sovereigns under the tutelage of the Federal 
government. 
4.  Dependant Sovereignty 
 The Marshall triad recognized tribal sovereignty, but relegated it to a status somewhat 
less than that of a traditional European state and subjecting it to Congressional interference.  
Johnson began the diminishment of tribal sovereignty by adopting the doctrine of discovery as 
the law of the land and thus limiting the tribes’ ability to alienate land.  Cherokee Nation 
followed by defining tribes as domestic dependant nations under the guardianship of Congress.  
Finally, although Worcester affirmed the sovereignty of tribes over the lands that they still held, 
it created the foundation for what would later become Congress’ plenary power over the tribes 
by asserting that Congress alone has the sole and plenary power to deal with tribes under the 
Constitution. 
B.  Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Plenary Power 
 Justice Marshall successfully placed the sole power to deal with the tribes in the hands of 
the federal government.  However, he also defined the tribes as dependants in a trust relationship 
with the federal government.  This plenary power to deal with tribal governments was interpreted 
by subsequent Courts as an affirmative grant of near limitless Congressional power over tribal 
nations.  The decision in Lone Wolf60 epitomizes this later trend. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian.”  Id.  Marshall also stated that 
these powers were “not limited by any restrictions on their free actions.”  Id. 
60 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
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1.  Finding the Plenary Power: From Crow Dog to Lone Wolf 
 In Ex Parte Crow Dog61 the Court addressed whether a tribal citizen within the Dakota 
Territory could be charged with murder under a federal statute applying to persons who commit 
murder within lands under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.62  The case hinged 
upon the interpretation of a treaty and its impact upon a statute which would otherwise prevent 
the application of the statute to tribal members.63  The Court decided that the federal statute did 
not apply to tribal citizens.64  The Court reasoned that subjecting tribes to the laws of an alien 
people should be avoided and that tribal sovereignty should be respected.65  To that end, the 
Court stated that if a law is to apply to tribal members, there must be a “clear expression of the 
intention of Congress” that the law should so apply.66 
 Congress responded to the decision in Crow Dog by enacting the Major Crimes Act67 
which granted federal courts the power to exercise jurisdiction over tribal members who commit 
certain specified crimes in Indian Territory.  When the Major Crimes Act was passed, it was still 
not clear that Congress had the power to take jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal 
citizens.  This question was addressed by the Court in United States v. Kagama.68 
                                                 
61 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
62 See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557-58 (1883). 
63 See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 562-71. 
64 See id. at 572. 
65 See id. at 571 (“It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that law, by argument and 
inference only, is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community, separated by 
race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to impose 
upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code.”).  Ironically, later Courts would use this same logic to 
deprive tribes of their sovereignty.  See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
66 Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (year). 
68 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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 In Kagama two tribal members challenged Congress’ power to enact the Major Crimes 
Act.69  The Court upheld Congress authority stating that “[i]t seems to us that this is within the 
competency of Congress.”70  The Court reasoned that this was the case, not because Congress 
had been granted such a power under the Constitution, but rather because of the circumstances of 
native tribes and their relationship to the United States.71  The Court stated that tribes were 
“within the geographical limits of the United States” and the tribes “within these limits are under 
the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the States of the Union.”72  
The Court further stated that because the tribes were weakened from dealings with the federal 
government, they had become “wards of the nation” and that they are now dependant upon the 
largess of the United States.73  The Court finally concluded that tribal dependence brought about 
                                                 
69 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375-76 (1886). 
70 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383. 
71 See id. at 384-85 (“The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak 
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they 
dwell.  It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its 
exercise is within the geographic limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and because it alone 
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”). 
72 Id. at 379.  The Court also erroneously stated that there were only two types of sovereignties within the territories 
of the United States: the federal government and the States.  Thus it appears that the Court mistakenly equated 
geographical sovereignty as to foreign European states (i.e. discovery sovereignty) with exclusive sovereignty over 
the same territory.  This departs from the doctrine enunciated by Marshall in Worcester that the tribes retained 
exclusive sovereignty, subject to the limits imposed by the discovery doctrine alone, over their lands.  See supra 
note 30 and accompanying text.  The correct exposition of Congressional power would have been to state that 
Congress must first extinguish the tribe’s sovereignty through purchase or conquest before it can exercise direct 
jurisdiction over tribal lands.  The Court seems to operate under an assumption, demonstrated by the language 
employed to grant Congress the power to legislate the Major Crimes Act, that tribal have already been divested 
through purchase or conquest in one fashion or another. 
73 Id. at 383-84. 
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by the guardian-ward relationship effectively conveyed the power to legislate over the tribes to 
Congress.74 
 By virtue of Kagama, the dependant-ward relationship first articulated in Cherokee 
Nation and the limitations on tribal sovereignty found in Johnson v. McIntosh, Congress’ 
authority to deal with the tribes had blossomed into a Congressional power to unilaterally alter 
the relationship between the United States and the tribes through legislation alone.  The full 
extent of this power and the implications for tribal sovereignty would not become fully clear 
until Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,75 where the Court clarified that tribal sovereignty was now 
completely placed within the hands of Congress. 
 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock tribal citizens complained that United States treaty 
commissioners had divested the tribe of its lands in contravention of a prior treaty agreement that 
required the signature of three-fourths of all adult male tribal citizens.76  The Court held that 
Congress had “[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations…from the beginning” and that the 
“power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial 
department of the government.”77  The Court noted that this plenary power included the power to 
abrogate treaty provisions, “though presumably only when circumstances arise which will not 
only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the 
                                                 
74 See id. at 384 (“From their weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal 
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, their arises the duty of protection, and with it 
the power.”). 
75 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
76 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903). 
77 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. 
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interest of the…Indians that it should do so.”78  The Court also stated that “the judiciary cannot 
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of” the legislation which 
acted in contravention of the treaty.79  Indeed the Court not only stated that it could not inquire 
into the motives of Congress but created a presumption that “Congress acted in perfect good 
faith in the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch 
of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises.”80  With this the Court placed 
tribal sovereignty blindly in the hands of Congress and disavowed itself of any responsibility to 
review Congress’ decisions.81 
2.  Historical Limits on the Plenary Power: Reserved Rights, the Canons of Construction and 
Fiduciary Duties 
 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution and federal common law as 
vesting a plenary power to deal with native tribes in the Congress of the United States, it has also 
                                                 
78 Id. at 566. 
79 Id. at 568. 
80 Id. 
81 Although the historical basis for the plenary doctrine has been questioned, see generally Robert N. Clinton, There 
is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 113 (2002) (arguing that the plenary power is 
not based on any textual source but rather upon a racist colonial policy), the recognition of a plenary power in 
Congress makes sense if one views tribes as separate sovereign foreign nations.  The Constitution clearly recognizes 
the national government as the sole arbiter of relations between the United States and foreign nations (See generally, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (provide for common defense), cl. 3 (regulate commerce with foreign Nations), cl. 4 
(naturalization), cl. 10 (piracies and punish offenses against the law of nations), cl. 11 (war powers), and art I., § 10, 
cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties)) and the Court has long recognized its inability to pass judgment 
on the foreign policy judgments of Congress or the Executive See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-13 (3rd ed. 2000) (describing the political question doctrine and its historical application 
in cases of foreign policy).  It is entirely within the purview of Congressional authority to wage war, recognize 
foreign governments, make treaties, abrogate treaties and otherwise regulate the relations of the nation with other 
countries.  However, at least since the decisions found in the Marshall trilogy, tribal nations have been semi-
incorporated into the federal structure of the United States and should, at a minimum, be entitled to protections 
similar to the respect afforded the divisions of power between the states and the federal government.  Until recently, 
the canons or construction and the reserved rights doctrine served this function.  See, infra, Section I.  B.  2.   
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recognized some limits on the exercise of this power.  The limitations imposed upon Congress 
take the form of three major canons of construction used to interpret treaties with tribes, a rule of 
statutory interpretation, a doctrine of reserved rights, and a limited form of fiduciary duty arising 
out of the trust relationship created by the guardian-ward line of cases.  Until the advent of the 
Rehnquist Court, these safeguards served to maintain a degree of tribal sovereignty that 
permitted tribal governments to govern the affairs of their people without being inadvertently 
subsumed by Congressional or state action.82 
 The starting point for analysis of legal questions involving tribal sovereignty will often 
begin with a close reading of the treaty or treaties between the tribe and the United States.83  
Because of the disparity in their respective bargaining positions, the Court has fashioned three 
canons for construing treaties between the United States and native tribes.84  The first canon of 
construction requires that treaties be read according to the understanding that the tribal members 
would have had.85  The second is that ambiguous terms within the treaty must be construed in 
favor of the tribe.86  Finally, treaties should be liberally construed in favor of the tribes.87 
                                                 
82 See infra, note 99 and accompanying text. 
83 See e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1973) (“The beginning of our analysis 
must be with the treaty…”). 
84 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1984) (“The canons of construction applicable 
in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.  Thus, it is well 
established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted 
to their benefit.” (internal citations omitted)). 
85 See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970). 
86 See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247. 
87 See id. 
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 In addition to the judicial requirements regarding the interpretation of treaties, the Court 
in United States v. Winans88 recognized reserved rights for tribal nations who entered into 
treaties with the United States.  Winans involved an action by the United States on behalf of the 
Yakima nation to enjoin activities by Winans and other non-Indians which obstructed the tribe’s 
off reservation fishing rights.89  The tribe had negotiated a treaty which ceded lands to the United 
States but reserved the excusive right to fish on the reservation and a retained right to fish off the 
reservation “‘at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory.’”90  
The issues were whether the treaty reserved off-reservation rights to tribal citizens and whether 
subsequent creation of a state and the granting of the non-reservation land to private citizens 
altered the tribe’s treaty rights. 
 The respondents argued that the language of the clause reserving off-reservation fishing 
rights should only be interpreted to grant tribal members the same rights as ordinary citizens and 
that even if that language were construed to grant additional rights, the subsequent admission of 
the territory as a state extinguished the tribe’s special privileges.91  The Court rejected the first 
argument as being inconsistent with how the tribal negotiators would have viewed the treaty.92  
The Court further held that the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but rather “a grant 
                                                 
88 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
89 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382 (1905) (noting that although the non-Indians should not be limited 
in their use of new technology, “it does not follow that they may construct a device which gives them exclusive 
possession of the fishing places.”). 
90 Winans, 198 U.S. at 378. 
91 See id. at 382-83. 
92 See id. at 380 (characterizing this result as “an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed 
to promise more and give the word of the Nation for more.”). 
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of rights from them” and a “reservation of those not granted.”93  To the Court “[n]o other 
conclusion would give effect to the treaty.”94  The Court also rejected the respondents’ second 
argument, stating that rights reserved by treaty are unaffected by the later creation of a state as it 
“was surely within the competency of the Nation to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the 
great rights they possessed.”95  The Court concluded by holding that the ceded lands were 
burdened by an easement in favor of the tribal members to enable them to exercise their fishing 
rights.96 
 Winans established two important treaty principles which shape the nature of tribal 
sovereignty.  First, treaties are a grant of rights from the tribes to the federal government and that 
those rights not granted to the federal government are reserved to the tribe.  Second, reserved 
rights cannot be abridged or abrogated by states.  The Winans rule, along with the canons serve 
to protect tribes from all encroachments on their sovereignty which are not explicitly intended by 
Congress.  This principal is also furthered by a rule of statutory interpretation that protects treaty 
rights from inadvertent abrogation through statutes of general application.97  Finally, the Court 
has moved away from the absolute nature of Congress’ plenary power.  Instead of absolute 
                                                 
93 Id. at 381. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 384. 
96 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 384. 
97 See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (“We decline to construe the Termination Act as a 
backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these Indians.  While the power to abrogate those 
rights exists ‘the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress.’” (citations 
omitted)).  See also Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48 (noting that Congressional intent must be plain and unambiguous). 
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authority to act in any way it deems fit, Congressional action must be rationally tied to the 
fulfillment of its trust obligations.98 
C.  Modern Tribal Sovereignty 
 The trend in modern tribal sovereignty has been one of judicially sanctioned 
encroachments upon tribal sovereignty.  This has been in spite of the continuing Congressional 
policy of encouraging tribal self-rule and independence and is often at direct odds with some 
members of the Court’s philosophy of restrained jurisprudence.99  The Court decisions of 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,100 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe101 and 
Montana v. United States102 signaled a shift in Court policy from requiring explicit 
Congressional action to generate changes in the relationships between the States, the Federal 
government and the tribes to a policy where the Court judicially modifies these relationships to 
meet its own policy objectives. 
                                                 
98 See Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
99 See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 205-235 
(2002) (devoting an entire section to the development of a judicially activist approach to tribal plenary power by a 
judicially conservative Court).  See also L. Scott Gould, Symposium: The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for 
Sovereignty: Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 
673 (2003) [hereinafter Gould] (arguing that current Court doctrine is based on a fixation with expanding the powers 
of the states and that tribal sovereignty can only be protected by insulating tribes from judicial scrutiny); Daan 
Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75 (2003) (characterizing the Court’s activist 
intervention in the erosion of tribal sovereignty as the result of them vs. us mentality in resolving sovereignty 
disputes); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Symposium: Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on 
the Paradoxical State of American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV. 113 (2002) [hereinafter Wildenthal] (examining 
how the Lone Wolf mentality of the Rehnquist Court has eroded tribal sovereignty); Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Symposium: Sixth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium: Making Sense Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A 
Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 348 (2001) (noting that at the same time that Congress chose to 
encourage tribal self rule, the Supreme Court switched from protecting tribal sovereignty to restricting tribal 
sovereignty). 
100 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
101 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
102 450 U.S. 544 (1980). 
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1.  McClanahan: Sovereignty as ‘Backdrop’ 
 Although Oliphant and Montana are the bases from which virtually all modern attacks on 
tribal sovereignty originate, these cases are the natural outgrowth of the minimization of tribal 
sovereignty found in McClanahan.  In McClanahan the Court was confronted with the question 
of whether Arizona’s income tax applied to a tribal member whose income was derived solely 
from within tribal territory.103  To resolve this issue the Court needed to address the impact of 
tribal sovereignty on Arizona’s power to tax tribal members.104 
 The Court in McClanahan recognized the inherent right of tribes to govern itself, but it 
rejected the notion that this inherent sovereignty by itself could bar state jurisdiction.105  The 
Court stated that “the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar 
to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.”106  However, the Court goes on 
to explain that this does not mean that sovereignty should be disregarded altogether, but rather 
that it “is relevant...not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but 
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be 
read.”107  As such the Court shifts its reliance from the nature of the tribe’s sovereignty to the 
statutes and treaties that define the relationship between the United States and the tribes.  If these 
                                                 
103 See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1973). 
104 See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168-69 (starting the analysis with a survey of cases dealing with tribal 
sovereignty). 
105 See id. at 172. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  The Court justified this striking modification of precedent by stating that “modern cases…avoid reliance on 
platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and…look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the 
limits of state power.”  Id. 
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items, the Court holds, in light of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty, indicate that the states 
attempted regulation has been foreclosed, then the state will not have jurisdiction.108 
 In the end the Court held that Arizona has no jurisdiction to tax the tribal member 
because the “activity is totally within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for 
the Federal Government and for the Indians themselves.”109  Unfortunately, the victory is a 
pyrrhic one, for now the Court has articulated a rule which has shifted from absolute immunity 
while sovereignty remains to one of pre-emption based upon a reading of statutes and treaties 
with sovereignty serving as one factor in interpreting these documents.  Thus the stage was set 
for Oliphant and Montana to further erode tribal sovereignty. 
2.  Oliphant: Unspoken Assumptions, Dependant Status and the Demise of Tribal Sovereignty 
 In Oliphant two non-Indian residents on tribal lands were arrested by tribal authorities for 
various offenses.110  The non-Indians contested their arrest on grounds that the tribal 
governments lacked jurisdiction to try non-Indians.111  The Court held that the tribal government 
lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians, even though the non-Indians were resided within the 
geographic limits of the tribal territory and even though they committed crimes on the tribe’s 
territory and against the tribe’s property.112  The reason, the Court stated, was that after analyzing 
                                                 
108 See Id. at 172-73. 
109 See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179-80. 
110 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978). 
111 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. 
112 See id. at 195. 
  
27 
 
the historical record it appeared to be an “unspoken assumption” that Congress as well as the 
other branches believed that tribes lacked the jurisdiction to try non-Indians.113 
 Relying on this “unspoken assumption” the Court stated that “[w]hile Congress never 
expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make 
express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently believed this 
to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”114  The Court completely ignores 
the requirements of precedent that any such divesture be explicitly mandated by an act of 
Congress.  Instead it now finds it sufficient to analyze historical documents (however selectively) 
to find an implicit divesture of tribal sovereignty.115 
 In one fell swoop Oliphant deprived tribal governments of their sovereign power to 
regulate the criminal behavior of all non-Indians within their territory.  The decision also started 
a full scale judicial assault against tribal sovereignty by diminishing the importance of the 
protections afforded to tribal sovereignty by the canons of construction and the reservation of 
powers doctrine expressed in Winans.  This policy of judicially limiting tribal sovereignty has 
                                                 
113 Id. at 203. 
114 Id. at 204 (emphasis added).  Of course the Court comes to this conclusion through an analysis of historical 
records which he states must be “read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who 
drafted them.”  Id. at 206.  In this way, the bigoted policies of the past are used to reshape and define the policies of 
the present. 
115 Professor Wildenthal noted that this holding “reversed the historic presumption of Worcester and Williams that 
Indian sovereign powers survive until and unless expressly revoked by Congress.”  See Wildenthal, supra note 99 at 
126.  Professor Wildenthal goes on to state that the Court based this upon historical findings supported by only one 
instance whereas “Rehnquist buried in a lengthy footnote a great deal of countervailing evidence, whose 
significance he distorted or disregarded.”  Id. 
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taken several forms,116 but the most devastating has been the erosion of the tribal power to 
regulate the behavior of persons within tribal territory. 
3.  Extending Oliphant: From Montana to Hicks 
 Montana was the first case to extend the holding in Oliphant.  The question in Montana 
was whether the tribe could civilly regulate non-Indians hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee 
land within the geographic limits of the tribe’s territory.117  The Court adopted the principles 
articulated in Oliphant and extended them to the civil context holding that the status of Indian 
tribes was inconsistent with their ability to regulate non-Indians on fee lands held by non-
Indians.118 
 To reach this conclusion the Court first analyzed the scope of the lands under the 
authority of the tribe.119  The Court noted that the tribe’s reservation was “‘set apart for the 
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named’”120 and held that this 
language gives the tribe the right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on tribal lands.121  
The Court then twists this language in on itself and reasoned that, since the treaty required 
undisturbed use and occupation, this power can only apply to lands which the tribe has lost 
                                                 
116 See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 113, 214-223 
(2002) (stating that the judicial attack on tribal sovereignty was accomplished by: 1) diminishing the geographic 
reach of the tribes, 2) enlarging state authority, and 3) diminishing tribal authority.).  If the Court continues on this 
path, tribes may soon be reduced to the status of glorified fraternal organizations. 
117 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1980). 
118 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
119 See id. at 547-48. 
120 Id. at 558 (quoting the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty) (emphasis in original). 
121 See id. at 558-59. 
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absolute and undisturbed control over.122  Thus the loss of absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation by the tribe also causes the loss of tribal authority to regulate the activities of non-
Indians on the land even when the land is found within the tribe’s territory.123 
 The Court explained that inherent tribal authority could not bridge the gap created by 
non-Indian ownership of property located within tribal territory.124  The Court specifically relied 
upon the holding in Oliphant by expanding it into a general principle which limited tribal 
authority over non-Indians.125  The Court did, however, hold that there were exceptions to this 
general rule.  The Court held that tribes could regulate nonmembers “who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.”126  In addition, the Court held that the tribe retained regulatory authority 
over non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation “when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”127  Montana extends the presumption of Oliphant that nonmembers are outside of the 
jurisdiction of tribes unless the nonmember’s activities are on land that the tribe has the 
exclusive control over or the nonmember’s activities fall within one of the exceptions.  Although 
the exceptions may appear to have saved tribal sovereignty from complete dissolution, in 
                                                 
122 See id. 
123 See id.  The Court has used this link to control of land to expand the areas under state authority and shrink the 
lands under tribal authority, even when those lands are clearly within the geographic limits of tribal territory.  See 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that right-of-way granted to state highway department 
divested tribe of jurisdiction under the Montana rule.  This in spite of clear statutory language indicating 
Congressional intent that right-of-ways remain Indian country.  See 18 U.S.C. 1151 (2000)).  See also supra, note 
116. 
124 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563. 
125 See id. at 565 (“the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the 
tribe.”). 
126 Id. at 565. 
127 Id. at 566. 
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practice the exceptions have not prevented the gradual, case-by-case, curtailment of tribal 
jurisdiction. 
 The Court further extended both Oliphant and Montana in Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.128  In Brendale the Court addressed whether state 
or tribal zoning applied to lands within the tribal reservation where some of the lands were open 
to the public and some of the lands were closed.129  Relying on Montana the plurality of the 
Court stated that the subsequent opening up of lands during the allotment period defeated the 
tribe’s right to exclusively regulate the land in the open areas.130  It further held that the Montana 
exceptions did not apply even though zoning has traditionally been regarded as a police power 
designed to protect the interests of the community and would seem to fall within the Montana 
exceptions.131 
 Finally, Nevada v. Hicks132 further extended Oliphant and Montana to such a point that it 
is highly unlikely that a tribe will ever be able to exercise jurisdiction over non-members even 
when those non-members are on tribal land.133  The question presented was whether the tribe had 
jurisdiction to hear a complaint by a tribal member against non-Indian officers who entered onto 
tribal land and allegedly violated the complainant’s civil rights.134  A majority of the Court 
                                                 
128 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
129 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414 (1989). 
130 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422. 
131 Id. at 429.  The Court specifically stated that “a literal application of the second exception would make little 
sense.”  Id.  Brendale is one of the cases which has since made it clear that the Montana exceptions are of little aid 
to tribes attempting to defend their sovereignty from judicial encroachments. 
132 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
133 L. Scott Gould characterizes the Hicks decision as one dictated by the Court’s new consent paradigm first 
articulated in Montana.  See Gould, supra note 99. 
134 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355-57 (2001). 
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rejected the tribe’s jurisdiction relying on Oliphant and Montana.135  The Court stated that the 
general principle found in Oliphant that tribes have no power over nonmembers was not limited 
by the rule in Montana.136  Instead the Court stated that Montana clarified that the “ownership 
status of land…is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of activities of 
nonmembers is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”137  As 
a result, even tribal ownership of the land will not necessarily permit the tribe to exercise its 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
 Thus by the dawn of the new century, tribal sovereignty had been reduced from the 
nearly absolute power to regulate tribal lands and affairs held under the Marshall trilogy to a 
mere backdrop which may or may not shed light on statutes and treaties.  Tribal governments 
had for all practical purposes lost the ability to regulate the conduct of nonmembers on tribal 
territory. 
II.  DURO V. REINA AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 Duro v. Reina138 is a logical extension of the holding found in Oliphant.  In Oliphant the 
Court held that, as was evidenced by ‘unspoken assumptions’, tribal governments had lost the 
sovereign power to try non-Indians for crimes committed within their territory.139  Duro 
extended this same logic to tribal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of 
                                                 
135 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364 (“We conclude today…that tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing 
process related to violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government.”). 
136 See Id. at 359. 
137 Id. at 360. 
138 495 U.S. 676 (1989). 
139 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978). 
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the tribe attempting to assert jurisdiction.140  Although the extension of Oliphant was not in itself 
surprising, the subsequent action by Congress to curtail the activism of the Court and correct the 
holding in Duro was somewhat of a surprise.  It is this sequence of events that has led up to the 
controversy in Lara in which the fate of tribal sovereignty hangs in the balance. 
A.  Duro v. Reina and the “Duro-fix” 
 Albert Duro was an enrolled member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians.141  In the summer of 1984 he was residing on the Salt River Indian Reservation with a 
friend and working for a tribal company.142  The Salt River Reservation is the territory held by 
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Tribe.143  In June of 1984 he allegedly shot and killed a 
fourteen year old Indian boy from a different tribe.144  As a result he was arrested by federal 
authorities and later handed over to tribal authorities who sought to try him for illegally firing a 
weapon on tribal lands.145  Mr. Duro filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court arguing 
that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to try him.146  The District Court agreed and ordered him freed 
on grounds that the arrest was a violation of due process.147  The Ninth Circuit took the appeal 
and after two opinions rejected the District Court’s reasoning and reversed.148  The Ninth Circuit 
held that the language of the federal jurisdiction statute granted jurisdiction to tribes for minor 
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crimes committed by any Indian even if a nonmember.149  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve a circuit split.150 
 The Court began by asserting that “[a] basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the 
power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or 
aliens.”151  But the Court quickly noted that Oliphant had changed that basic premise for 
tribes.152  The Court looked to its opinion in United States v. Wheeler153 for the proposition that 
tribes could only regulate the conduct of their own members.154  The Court was very concerned 
with Duro’s status noting that “[n]either he nor other members of his Tribe may vote, hold office, 
or serve on a jury under Pima-Maricopa authority.”155  This, the Court stated, placed Duro in the 
same situation as the non-Indian in Oliphant and that as a result the same protections should 
apply.156  The Court also looked at the historical evidence and concluded that from a very early 
time in United States history, tribes had only had the ability to govern internal relations.157  As 
such, the Court held that the tribe lacked the power to try a nonmember Indian.158 
 In response to the decision in Duro, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(“ICRA”)159 to specifically recognize the inherent power of tribal governments to exercise 
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criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.160  Congress also revised the definition of Indians to ensure 
that all Indians were covered under the tribal jurisdiction regardless of the status of the individual 
Indian with respect to the tribe attempting to assert jurisdiction.161  These changes to the ICRA 
are often referred to as the “Duro-fix”. 
B.  The Nature of Tribal Sovereignty after Duro v. Reina 
 The “Duro-fix” restored to the tribes the power to criminally prosecute nonmember 
Indians but it created serious concerns regarding the ability of Congress to restore tribal 
sovereignty.  The first concern revolved around the nature of inherent tribal sovereignty itself 
and whether it could be lost and then later restored such that it remained inherent.  The next 
concern was whether a Supreme Court pronouncement on the nature of tribal sovereignty was 
constitutional in nature, thus leaving final say to the Court, or whether it was based on federal 
common law which Congress has the power to modify.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits addressed 
these issues in a series of opinions which culminated in the grant of a writ of certiorari for United 
States v. Lara.162 
1.  The “Duro-fix” in the Ninth Circuit: Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court & United 
States v. Enas 
 In Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court,163 Means was arrested by tribal authorities 
for sexual assault.164  Means was living on Northern Cheyenne territory but was a member of the 
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Sisseton-Wapatan Tribe and therefore was considered a nonmember Indian under the rule stated 
in Duro.165  Means appealed his arrest through the tribal courts claiming that the Northern 
Cheyenne had no jurisdiction under the Duro rule.166  After the Northern Cheyenne courts 
affirmed the jurisdiction of the tribe, Means brought an action in district court which was treated 
as a writ of habeas corpus.167  The District Court denied relief and the case was appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.168  Because the alleged crimes were committed before the enactment of the “Duro-
fix”, the court was compelled to address two important questions: 1) whether the “Duro-fix” 
could apply retroactively and 2) whether the “Duro-fix” was a congressional delegation of 
authority or part of the tribe’s inherent sovereignty.169 
 The court began by analyzing the legislative history of the “Duro-fix” amendments and 
acknowledged that Congress was acting to negate the effect of the rule espoused in Duro.170  The 
court noted that, although Congress was attempting to negate Duro, it was attempting to do so by 
recognizing and affirming that tribes had always had the sovereign authority to try nonmember 
Indians.171  In looking at this the court stated “[w]hile Congress is always free to amend laws it 
believes the Supreme Court has misinterpreted, it cannot somehow erase the fact that the Court 
did interpret prior law.”172  And once the Supreme Court has interpreted the law, the court 
continued, the “Court’s decision is the correct statement of what the law always was, even if no 
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one knew it until the Supreme Court so held.”173  The result, the court reasoned, is that 
“regardless of Congress’ intent to declare that tribes always had the inherent authority to try non-
member Indians, that simply cannot be what the amendments accomplished.”174  Thus the 
problem was narrowed to a question of the scope of Congressional authority. 
 The court did not question Congress’ power to pass the “Duro-fix”, but it believed that 
the Congressional “Duro-fix” must be seen, in light of the holding in Duro, as an “affirmative 
delegation of power” that necessitated a retroactive applicability analysis.175  The court then 
noted that Congress clearly evinced an intention to have the amendments apply retroactively, but 
that the retroactive application would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex 
post facto laws.176  The court reasoned that this would be the case, because under the Duro rule, 
Means would not have been subject to the punishment of two sovereigns.177  Thus although the 
court uses language indicating that the amendments are a delegation of power, it also stated that 
under the “Duro-fix”, the tribe would be able to prosecute under its inherent authority and as 
such no double jeopardy problem would result.  The ambiguous nature of the language, 
therefore, left the question open as to whether the court was interpreting the “Duro-fix” to be a 
true delegation of Congress’ jurisdiction or whether Congress was simply restoring the inherent 
sovereign authority of the tribe. 
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 This question was subsequently addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court in United States v. 
Enas.178  In Enas there was no question of retroactive application.  Enas, a member of the San 
Carlos Apache Tribe, was charged by the White Mountain Apache Tribe for assault with a 
deadly weapon and assault with the intent to cause serious bodily injury.179  He pled guilty and 
was later indicted by a federal grand jury.180  On Enas’ motion the district court dismissed the 
case reasoning that the Means case had established that tribes obtained their authority to 
prosecute as a delegation from Congress and thus tribes acted under the same sovereignty as the 
federal government.181  As such the federal government could not try Enas without violating the 
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.182  A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s grant and the full panel decided to hear the case to decide the impact of Duro 
on the circumstances of the case.183 
 The Ninth Circuit noted that the question was one of sovereignty.184  If the tribe 
“exercises inherent power, it flexes its own sovereign muscle, and the dual sovereignty exception 
to double jeopardy permits federal and tribal prosecutions for the same crime.”185  On the other 
hand, “when a tribe exercises power delegated to it by Congress, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibits duplicative tribal and federal prosecutions.”186  The court then examined the 
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relationship between the Duro decision and the “Duro-fix” and noted that these decisions 
reflected a divergence between the two branches over the nature of tribal sovereignty.187  As 
such, the majority stated, the question became one of separation of powers.188  If the Supreme 
Court was interpreting the Constitution, the court stated, then Congress would be unable to alter 
the nature of tribal sovereignty without delegating its own sovereign authority to the tribes.189  
On the other hand, if the Duro decision was not based on the Constitution, but rather was simply 
an exposition of federal common law, then it was within the power of Congress to alter the 
nature of the federal common law and find that the tribes’ inherent sovereignty included the 
power to prosecute nonmember Indians.190  The court explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s 
finding that Duro had Constitutional dimensions.191  Instead the court held that the Duro, 
Oliphant and Wheeler decisions, based upon their use of historical analysis to find an implicit 
Congressional divestiture of tribal sovereignty, were “founded on federal common law.”192 
 Since the prior Supreme Court decisions were based on the federal common law, the 
Ninth Circuit majority held that Congress could alter those decisions and redefine the nature of 
inherent tribal sovereignty.193  This holding preserved the Means decision’s holding regarding 
the retroactivity of the “Duro-fix”, but overruled it to the extent that it may have implied that 
                                                 
187 See id. at 670. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 673 (“When the issue is a constitutional one, the courts have the last word.”). 
190 See id. 
191 Enas, 255 F.3d at 674 (“To hold, as did the Weaselhead panel majority, that this is a constitutional 
issue…ignores the glaring omission of constitutional discourse from Duro, Oliphant and Wheeler.” (citations 
omitted)). 
192 Id. at 673. 
193 See id. at 675. 
  
39 
 
Congress lacked this power or that the delegation was one of federal sovereignty.194  The Ninth 
Circuit concurrence agreed that the prior Supreme Court decisions were interpretations of federal 
common law and that Congress had final authority to decide what the common law was, but 
disagreed about the scope and nature of the Congressional power to declare the common law.195 
 The concurrence felt that “Means…misinterpreted the effect of the 1990 ICRA (the 
“Duro-fix”) amendments on the sovereign power of the tribes.”196  The concurrence noted that 
Congress has the power to authorize the states to enact legislation which would otherwise violate 
the commerce clause, but that in so acting, the “fact that Congress authorized the state legislation 
does not mean that when the state legislates, it acts as an arm of the federal government.”197  The 
concurrence felt that Congress has the absolute power to add or subtract from tribal sovereignty 
and that any such addition was by definition part of the tribes’ inherent sovereignty.198  The 
majority had rejected this view because they rejected the notion that Congress could define any 
power as inherent and by this circumvent the limitations imposed by the Constitution.199  Thus in 
the end the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that Congress had the power, in this case, to redefine 
the inherent sovereignty of tribes without delegating the sovereignty of the federal government 
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and thus creating double jeopardy concerns.  The only dissention occurred in defining the scope 
of the power possessed by Congress. 
2.  The “Duro-fix” in the Eighth Circuit: United States v. Weaselhead & United States v. 
Lara 
 The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the interplay between Duro, the “Duro-fix” and 
tribal sovereignty was the exact opposite from that of the Ninth Circuit.  In United States v. 
Weaselhead,200 the Eighth Circuit held that the prior Duro decision was one of constitutional 
dimensions and that as such, Congress could only restore criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians to the tribes by delegating its own sovereign authority.201 
 In Weaselhead, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a tribe prosecuting a 
nonmember Indian was acting under authority of its own inherent sovereignty or under a 
delegation of federal sovereign authority.202  In the case, Weaselhead had pled guilty to a sexual 
assault charge brought by the tribe and was later indicted by a federal grand jury for the same 
conduct as well as additional sexual assault charges.203  Weaselhead pleaded not guilty and filed 
a motion to dismiss the count based on the conduct for which he was already punished by the 
tribe.204  He argued that this count violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.205  
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The district court denied the motion and the case was appealed to a three judge panel of the 
Eighth Circuit.206 
 The panel court reduced the question to one of tribal sovereignty and whether the “Duro-
fix” restored inherent sovereignty or was an affirmative delegation of congressional authority.207  
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the majority of the Eighth Circuit panel felt that the Duro opinion was 
not based upon federal common law but rather that it had constitutional implications.208  The 
court stated that this was the case because “all Indians are also full citizens of the United States, 
(and) such an intrusion necessarily implicates “constitutional limitations.””209  The further stated 
that “[c]riminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on personal liberty that its 
exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their 
submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States.”210  The court further worried that 
Congress was attempting to “recast history in a manner that alters the Supreme Court’s stated 
understanding of the organizing principles by which the Indian tribes were incorporated into our 
constitutional system of government.”211  This was worrisome to the court because the 
affirmation of tribal jurisdiction would subject nonmembers to the criminal jurisdiction of tribes 
in violation of the basic tenet of American Jurisprudence that government was to be by the 
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consent of the governed.212  The court concluded by asserting that the “ascertainment of first 
principles regarding the position of Indian tribes within our constitutional structure of 
government is a matter ultimately entrusted to the Court and thus beyond the scope of Congress’ 
authority.”213 
 The decision by the panel was reheard by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc.214 The court 
then vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court’s holding that Duro was not an 
interpretation of constitutional principles.215  As a result the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, was 
compelled to revisit the issues addressed by the courts in the two Weaselhead cases  in United 
States v. Lara.216 
 Lara involved a similar situation to that found in Weaselhead.  Lara was arrested by 
officers of the Spirit Lake Nation for various offenses to which he pleaded guilty.217  Thereafter, 
a federal grand jury indicted Lara for offenses arising from the same conduct.218  Lara filed a 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds but was denied.219  A panel of the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court but the entire Eighth Circuit decided to rehear the appeal en banc.220  
The full circuit adopted the reasoning of the majority panel in the Weaselhead decision issued by 
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the panel.221  The court held that the nature of tribal sovereignty had constitutional implications 
and that “[o]nce the federal sovereign divests a tribe of a particular power, it is no longer an 
inherent power and it may only be restored by delegation of Congress’ power.”222  Thus the 
Eighth Circuit in Lara, over a vociferous dissent, came to the exact opposite result of the full 
Ninth Circuit in Enas.  In order to settle the split, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari 
in Lara.223 
III.  THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO RESTORE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 The effect of Congressional action, whether actual or implied by the Court, upon tribal 
sovereignty depends upon two factors: the nature of tribal sovereignty and the Constitutional 
limits placed upon tribal sovereignty.  Because of the nature of sovereignty, it cannot be lost or 
destroyed by the unilateral action of one sovereign against another.  Likewise, the Constitution 
places no limits upon tribal sovereignty, as such all modern limitations upon tribal sovereignty 
are the result of Congressional acts or executive actions that either explicitly or implicitly, 
through judicial interpretations, fetter the tribal nations’ ability to exercise full sovereignty.  
Because the Constitution is silent as to the exact nature of the federal government’s power to 
deal with tribal nations, Congressional legislation regarding tribal nations and the interpretations 
proffered by the Supreme Court are necessarily part of the federal common law and Congress is 
supreme when it comes to stating what the common law is. 
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A.  The Nature of Sovereignty 
 One of the overriding questions presented in the cases addressing the interplay of Duro v. 
Reina224 and the “Duro-fix” is the nature of Congress’ power to restore sovereignty that has been 
lost.225  The Court in Duro clearly held that the tribes had lost their sovereign power to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.226  Whether this holding was correct or in 
adherence with previous precedent is irrelevant.  As was noted by the court in Enas, once the 
Court decided that it had been lost, then it must be treated as having been divested by 
Congress.227  But this leaves open the question of what such a divestment means and the 
meaning of such a divestment in turn depends upon the general nature of sovereignty. 
 Although the court in Weaselhead pointed it out as a reason to justify preventing the tribe 
from exercising its jurisdiction, sovereignty in American jurisprudence has been traditionally 
derived from the consent of the governed.228  It is this consent that gives legitimacy to the 
government and enables it to exercise the full powers associated with sovereignty.  Once 
sovereignty has been conferred by the governed, it seems logical that it cannot be expanded or 
destroyed without the consent of the very governed who first granted it.  If it were possible to 
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expand or destroy sovereignty without the consent of the governed, then there would be no need 
for their consent in the first instance. 
 Yet this is precisely the result declared by the court in Lara.229  The court stated that 
“[o]nce the federal sovereign divests a tribe of a particular power,it is no longer an inherent 
power and it may only be restored by delegation of Congress’ power.”230  But this logic is 
flawed.  Because sovereignty is a grant from the governed it cannot be altered by an outside 
force.  The third party restrain another’s sovereignty by agreements in the form of treaties or 
constitutions or through brute force as in the case of an occupying power, but it is never 
destroyed by these actions.  In such a case, the sovereignty is simply fettered by the agreement or 
through the power of the occupying force.  If those restraints are later removed, the sovereignty 
will be seen to exist to the same extent that it did when first bestowed by the consent of the 
governed.  This is precisely the point made by the concurrence in Enas when it noted that the 
states delegated (i.e. gave up by agreement) their sovereign power over interstate commerce to 
the federal government, but that this did not mean that the states act as an arm of the federal 
government when Congress restores their right to regulate in this area.231  Instead, once the limits 
placed upon their sovereignty are removed by Congressional legislation, the states are considered 
to act under their own inherent authority.232 
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 In this sense, Congress is incapable of truly divesting any nation, whether a Native 
American Nation or a foreign nation, of its sovereignty.  Only the governed can withdraw their 
consent and with it the legitimate sovereign power.  Congress and the executive, however, 
through its foreign relations powers, may choose to recognize a sovereign nation hitherto not 
recognized.233  Likewise they may also utilize the war powers to suppress the sovereignty of a 
foreign or domestic nation.  This may be done in innumerable ways ranging from refusing to 
recognize a sovereign, to legislating limits upon the sovereign (whether effectual or otherwise), 
by negotiating limitations (as with the Constitution or via treaties), or by conquering the 
sovereign and repressing its populace.  In any event the full sovereignty still exists in spite of the 
Congressional action; it is simply impaired while the Congressional action is still enforced.234  
Whether the federal government chooses to so act is a question of policy and should remain with 
the branches assigned the task of generating and carrying out policy. 
 Since the Constitution governs the relationships between the founding states and the 
federal government and was not consented to by any tribal nation, it does not directly affect the 
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nature of any tribe’s sovereignty.  Tribal sovereignty can only be affected by the Constitutional 
provisions that grant the federal government the power to affect sovereigns through direct action.  
Thus the true question presented by the interplay of Duro and the “Duro-fix” is to what extent 
the constitution restrains Congress’ power to legislate policy regarding the sovereignty of foreign 
and domestic nations and what is the role of the Supreme Court in enforcing those limits. 
B.  The Constitution and Sovereignty 
 The Constitution clearly restrains Congress from interfering with the sovereignty of the 
domestic sovereigns (i.e. states) that make up the United States.  This is accomplished by 
enumerating the specific powers that are vested in the federal government and preserving the 
remainder for the states or the people.235  The Constitution also clearly indicates that the federal 
government shall have all of the sovereign powers necessary for it to effect policy toward foreign 
sovereigns.236  Thus Congress has the absolute right to recognize or refuse to recognize a foreign 
sovereign, to invade and conquer a foreign sovereign, or to relinquish control of a foreign 
sovereign and thus permit it to govern itself again.  The states are likewise restrained from 
legislating their own policy towards foreign sovereigns.237  However, the Constitution gives no 
clear indication as to the limitations imposed on Congress’ power to legislate policy with regards 
to tribal sovereignty.238 
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 The fact that the Constitution does not clearly delineate the limits imposed upon 
Congress’ ability to modify the sovereign to sovereign relationship with native tribes does not 
mean that there are no limits whatsoever on Congress’ authority.239  But those limits must be 
based on something more than the belief that once Congress has acted, implicitly or explicitly, to 
reduce tribal sovereignty, that it may not retract its earlier action and pursue a new policy.  To do 
so would place Congress in the untenable position of having its policy options frozen by the 
Supreme Court on principles not founded upon the text of the Constitution.  When coupled with 
the Court’s power to interpret Congressional action as divesting tribes of their sovereignty, this 
essentially transforms the Supreme Court into the de facto tribal policy making body.  This is a 
role that the Constitution clearly does not evince for the Court. 
 Because the constitution leaves the question open, the better reasoned approach, and the 
approach which recognizes the immutable nature of sovereignty, is that taken by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Enas.240  The Enas court correctly held that the Congressional policy 
toward tribal sovereignty is one of federal common law.241  And when the federal common law is 
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the nature of tribal sovereignty at will and it is irrelevant whether the sovereignty was part of the tribe’s original 
sovereignty.  See id. at 675-83. 
241 See Enas, 255 F.3d at 673 (“Duro is not a constitutional decision but rather, like Oliphant and Wheeler, a 
decision founded on federal common law.”). 
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in question, Congress’ interpretation reigns supreme.242  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit reasoning 
relied upon weak references to the “ascertainment of first principles” and decisions with 
“constitutional limitations” without being able to find direct support in the Constitution.243  In 
addition, the Eighth Circuit completely ignored the nature of the analysis in the prior Supreme 
Court precedent to come to the conclusion that the Duro decision was constitutional in nature.244 
 Although the en banc decision in Enas was unanimous, there were two very different 
theories regarding the nature of Congress’ power to alter tribal sovereignty. 
 The majority of the court felt that Congress had the power to restore tribal sovereignty, 
but that it could not vest the tribe with more sovereignty than it originally possessed.245  But this 
reasoning seems to imply that tribes may have had less than full sovereignty at some point and 
thus ignores the immutable nature of sovereignty.  Likewise, it leaves open the possibility that 
the Court will simply assert the right to define the limits of tribal sovereignty based upon its 
peculiar reading of the historical record.  The end result is a return to the activism of the 
Rehnquist Court in a different guise.  The concurrence avoids this problem by placing the power 
squarely in the hands of Congress. 
 The concurrence recognizes the immutable nature of sovereignty by noting that Congress 
can recognize tribal sovereignty in any amount and at any time and that this sovereignty is then 
                                                 
242 See id. at 675 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)). 
243 See supra notes 209 & 213 and accompanying text. 
244 The Ninth Circuit in Enas noted that the Eighth Circuit “ignores the glaring omission of constitutional discourse 
from Duro, Oliphant and Wheeler.”  See Enas, 255 F.3d at 674.  The court further notes that, “[i]t would be 
extraordinary indeed if those were constitutional decisions that simply neglected to mention the Constitution.  If 
there is a constitutional dimension to those decisions, we cannot divine it from the language of the opinions.”  See 
id. 
245 See id. at 670. 
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inherent.246  The concurrence employs the metaphor of a vessel that Congress can fill or drain at 
its pleasure,247 but this implies that Congress has the power to create and or destroy sovereignty.  
The sovereignty possessed by tribes is complete unto itself and is not a vessel that can be filled 
or drained at the pleasure of Congress.  The sovereignty exists fully and completely and 
Congress can only use its power to prevent or permit its exercise.  But the effect of the 
concurrences approach is the same:  Congress can permit the tribal governments to exercise their 
full sovereignty or some intermediate measure and this will still be inherent sovereignty. 
 The Enas approach, both the majority and the concurrence, recognizes the power of the 
federal government to affect the sovereignty of tribes.  In addition, it recognizes the proper role 
of the Supreme Court in interpreting Congressional action without placing the Supreme Court in 
the position of final arbiter of federal Indian policy.  This is accomplished by placing federal 
Indian policy into the realm of federal common law, where the Court can interpret to arrive at 
intermediate solutions to controversies, but where Congress has the final word. 
 Until the nation realizes the value of partnering with tribal nations and fully incorporates 
the tribes into the federalist system, the approaches employed by the Enas court will at least 
serve to preserve the tribes from judicial restraints upon their sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
246 See id. at 680-81. 
247 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 With the looming threat of international terrorism, America needs more allies in the 
struggle to secure our homeland.  Tribal nations have the potential to be effective allies in the 
struggle against terrorism.  Tribal nations are in the best position to fashion laws to ensure the 
security of their territory and enable their citizens to meet the challenges of terrorism.  
Unfortunately, the Court has consistently furthered a policy of limiting tribal sovereignty in spite 
of Congressional policies favoring tribal sovereignty.  This problem can only be addressed by a 
policy which reaffirms and recognizes the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations.  This is 
precisely what Congress did when it overruled Duro v. Reina.  However, it remains to be seen if 
the Court will reverse the trend disfavoring tribal sovereignty by adhering to the division of 
powers found in the Constitution. 
 The Constitution exclusively vests the power to deal with Indian tribes in the Congress of 
the United States.  Because this power rests solely with Congress and not the Supreme Court, the 
Court can only interpret the actions of Congress to determine whether and to what degree tribal 
sovereignty has been restrained.  This interpretation of Congressional action constitutes an 
interpretation of federal common law which Congress is free to alter through legislative 
pronouncements of what the law really is.  Thus in the case of the “Duro-fix”, Congress was free 
to alter the law so as to negate the effect of Duro.  Since sovereignty cannot be destroyed, 
Congress is likewise free to unfetter tribal sovereignty without fear that such action will 
constitute a delegation of Congressional sovereignty.  As such, the prosecution of Lara by both 
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the tribe and the federal government does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
